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Abstract 
 Previously, empirical financial studies paid little attention to the role of diversification 
strategy on financial choices. The aim of the present study is to analyze the financing strategies of 
multibusiness firms, suggesting the relevance of sorting the diversification phenomena into its 
related and unrelated components.  
 The implications of our findings are very relevant in that they explain earlier contradictory 
results on capital-structure determinants. The degree of product specialization/diversification and 
the direction of diversification (related or unrelated) translate into different corporate financial 
behaviours. 
 In particular, the two types of diversification- related or unrelated, had opposite effects on 
debt. Specifically, a related-diversification strategy, which is associated with lower debt ratios, has 
a negative influence on leverage. By contrast, unrelated diversity, which is associated with higher 
debt usage, has a positive effect on debt. According to the coinsurance effect and the transaction-
cost hypothesis, unrelated-diversified firms have a higher debt capacity and can assume more debt 
as a source of finance. Moreover, the capital-structure decisions of unrelated-diversified firms seem 
to be strictly aimed at reaching their target optimal debt level—a behaviour that is consistent with 
the trade-off hypothesis. On the other hand, related-diversified firms adjust more slowly towards 
their target capital structure 
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1. Introduction  
Diversification and capital structure are two concepts that have long been controversial, 
since they impact on many other aspects of business and financial management. Diversification has 
been a central topic in strategic management studies since the work of Ansoff (1958). The costs and 
benefits derived from the various diversification strategies have been examined mainly for their 
impact on a firm’s value (Rumelt 1974). Studies on the interaction between diversification and 
capital structure became of interest because of their associated strategic implications regarding 
corporate governance. Indeed, starting with the study of Jensen and Meckling (1976), financial 
choices have been evaluated because of the close interaction between capital structure and 
management choices
2
. In the 1980s, other researchers, motivated by the connection between 
investment and financial choices, highlighted the link between capital structure and diversification 
(Oviatt 1984, Titman 1984, Jensen 1986, Barton and Gordon 1987, Williamson 1988, Titman and 
Wessels 1988, Gertner et al. 1988, Barton and Gordon 1988).  
Many authors suggested that diversified firms need to carry greater leverage to maximize 
firm value (Kaplan and Weisbach 1992, Li and Li 1996, Singh et al. 2003); in particular, “a 
combination of diversification with low leverage leads to overinvestment” (Li and Li 1996). To 
reduce this kind of agency problem, it has been observed empirically that relatively more debt is 
carried by diversified firms than by non-diversified firms (Riahi-Belkaoui and Bannister 1994, Li 
and Li 1996). However, based on the findings of Comment and Jarrell (1995), this observation 
seems not to be robust with respect to the kinds of variables used to operationalize the concept of 
diversification
3
. Research carried out on the relation between diversification and capital structure 
has led to several interesting contributions (Markides and Williamson 1996, Kochhar 1996, 
Kochhar and Hitt 1998) aimed at improving the theoretical approach by formalizing clear-cut 
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 Barton and Gordon (1987) pointed out that corporate strategies complement traditional finance paradigms and enrich 
the understanding of a firm’s capital-structure decisions. 
3
 The results of Comment and Jarrell (1995) can be interpreted to mean either that diversification does not increase debt 
capacity or that managers of diversified firms do not choose to exploit their greater debt capacity. 
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research proposals (Lowe et al. 1994, Taylor and Lowe 1995, Markides and Williamson 1996, 
Kochhar 1996, Kochhar and Hitt 1998).  
In this paper, the role of diversification, related and unrelated, in the capital-structure 
choices is analyzed. The study was carried out in the context of research on capital-structure 
determinants (how does diversification influence capital structure?), which has attempted to explain 
the effects of diversification strategy on financial choices. In particular, we want to verify if the 
coinsurance effect, the agency cost argument or the transaction cost argument are able to support 
the effect of diversification on capital structure choices. 
The present research extends prior analyses of financial policy and diversification by 
examining the relation between capital structure and diversification over a long period (27 years). It 
highlights how related diversification, compared to unrelated diversification, differently affects 
financing decisions. This research analyses the different intensity in the capital structure 
determinants for clusters of firms. The sample was sorted into three groups according to the cluster 
analysis approach (specialized firms, related-diversified firms and unrelated-diversified firms). 
Furthermore, relating to the ongoing debate on the firm’s optimal capital structure, we provide a 
contribution in the relatively limited literature on the dynamics of the capital structure decision by 
examining the dynamics of the relation between leverage and a set of explanatory variables. We 
investigate the adjustment process to the target capital structure for our sample of Italian firms, 
focusing on the different speed of adjustment for specialized, related-diversified and unrelated-
diversified firms. The model is estimated by using panel data methodology in order to eliminate the 
unobservable heterogeneity. Specifically, we use the GMM technique to control for the endogeneity 
problem, the importance of which has been demonstrated by extensive literature. Some robustness 
checks were applied. 
Our study is structured as follows: the second section points out the theoretical perspectives 
applied to the analysis. The third section describes the specificity of the empirical model and the 
applied variables. In the fourth section, the sample and the descriptive statistics are presented. The 
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fifth section details the empirical results. Section six shows our robustness analysis. Finally, section 
seven highlights the main findings of the study and offers several suggestions for management and 
for future research.  
2. Theoretical Perspectives 
Many researchers have attempted to determine which theory, trade-off or pecking order, is 
better able to approximate and explain firms’ financing behaviours. The goal of several studies has 
been to understand capital-structure decisions in the light of firm-specific features, industry 
affiliation, and institutional environments. Recent reviews on capital structure by Myers (2003), 
Frank and Goyal (2008), and Parson and Titman (2007) summarize much of the recent literature. 
However, only a few studies have related corporate diversification features to different capital-
structure decisions (Taylor and Lowe 1995, Markides and Williamson 1996, Kochhar and Hitt 
1998, Chkir and Cosset 2001, Singh et al. 2003, Alonso 2003).  
A literature review suggests that sorting diversification phenomena into related and 
unrelated
4
 ones can enhance our understanding of their link to capital structure, with a better 
understanding of the capital structure determinants. Thus, previous studies (Singh et al. 2003, Low 
and Chen 2004) that did not take into account these two components are potentially biased. 
The effect of diversification on capital-structure choices has been explained mostly through 
the coinsurance effect (Lewellen 1971, Kim and McConnell 1977, Bromiley 1990, Bergh 1997), 
the transaction cost theory (Williamson 1988, Balakrishnan and Fox 1993, Kochhar and Hitt 1998), 
and by applying the agency cost theory (Jensen 1986, Kochhar 1996).  
The coinsurance effect deals with the reduction of operating risk due to the imperfect 
correlation between the different cash flows of a firm running diverse businesses (Lewellen, 1971; 
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 Related diversification is based on operational synergies related to: (1) resource sharing in the value chains among 
businesses, and (2) the transfer of skills, which involves the transfer of knowledge from one value chain to the other. 
Thus, related diversification is based on the sharing and transfer of skills connected to tangible (plant and equipment, 
sales forces, distribution channels) and intangible (brand names, innovative capabilities, know-how) resources. 
Conversely, unrelated diversification is associated with the financial synergies hypothesis, which states that firms 
diversify to benefit from the economies of an internal capital market and an internal labor market, to obtain tax benefits, 
and to reduce business risk (coinsurance argument). Financial resources, which are more mobile and less rare and thus 
likely to create less value than other types of resources, are associated with unrelated diversification. For details on the 
definitions of related and unrelated diversification, the reader is referred to Ansoff (1958), Lewellen (1971), and 
Rumelt (1974). 
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Kim and McConnell, 1977). It is more relevant for firms that develop unrelated diversification 
strategies because the lack of correlation between businesses is greater: these firms should be able 
to assume more debt (Kim and McConnell 1977 and Bergh 1997)
5
. The transaction cost approach 
deals with the governance of contractual relations in transactions between two parties (Williamson 
1988). In particular, by matching corporate finance theory and strategy theory, this approach 
examines a firm’s financial decisions in terms of its specific assets, considering debt and equity as 
alternative governance structures (Markides and Williamson 1996). Firms diversify their activities 
in response to the presence of an excess of unutilized assets (Penrose 1959), and the kind of 
diversification strategy depends on the characteristics of these resources (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt 
1991, Mahoney and Pandian 1992)
6
. Therefore, the transaction cost approach, considering debt as a 
rule-based governance structure and equity as a discretionary governance device; supports the use 
of debt to finance non-specific assets and the use of equity to finance specific ones (Williamsom 
1988)
7
. As a consequence, in the presence of highly specific assets (mainly associated with related-
diversified firms), that keep a limited liquidation value in case of default, equity is the preferred 
financial instrument because such assets cannot be easily re-employed. In contrast, in the presence 
of general purpose assets (mainly associated to unrelated-diversified firms), more valuable as 
collateral and able to retain their value in the event of liquidation/default, debt is the preferred 
financing tool (relation with debtholders, based on the availability of non specific assets, are 
cheaper)
8
. Agency cost theory, rooted on the existence of conflicts of interest between shareholders 
                                                 
5
 Consistent with this argument, several studies (Kim and McConnell 1977, Bergh 1997 and Alonso 2003) have found 
that the coinsurance effect is one of the most important value-increasing sources associated with unrelated 
diversification. Firms that follow unrelated diversification can issue more debt and benefit from the fiscal advantages 
related to debt financing (Bergh 1997). The tax liability of the diversified firm may be less than the cumulated tax 
liabilities of the different (single) business units. 
6
 An excess of highly specific assets is more likely to lead to related diversification because these assets can only be 
transferred across similar businesses. Conversely, an unrelated diversification strategy should be based on the presence 
of an excess of non-specific assets. 
7
 Debt financing requires a firm to make interest and principal payments according to a schedule stipulated in the 
contract; in the event of default, debtholders may exercise their pre-emptive claims against the firm’s assets (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1992). At the same time, the shareholders bear a residual-claimant status with regard to earnings and to 
assets liquidation; their relations with the firms last for the lifetime of the business. 
8
 For instance, in the case of financial distress, a firm that operates in three sectors, grocery, mechanical and 
pharmaceutical, and that has basically general-purpose assets, has the opportunity to liquidate the assets easily and 
quickly (as it is useable in many activities and industry sectors). As a consequence, the higher capacity to meet the 
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and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)
9
, provides a further theoretical scheme that supports the 
influence of diversification strategy on capital structure (Kochhar 1996 and Kochhar and Hitt 1998). 
Jensen (1986) pointed out the disciplining role of debt on managerial behaviour, in that it reduces 
managerial discretion regarding free-cash flow. Thus, the Jensen perspective supports the positive 
role of debt in reducing the ability of a manager to realize detrimental diversification strategies, 
especially unrelated ones. As a consequence, the result of diversification on the debt/equity choice 
can be interpreted according to the monitoring effect. Stakeholders, and in particular shareholders, 
are assumed to have the capacity to affect the strategic decisions of managers, in order to avoid a 
diversification strategy, especially unrelated, being realized for opportunistic reasons. 
Consequently, shareholders will promote the use of debt as a device to discipline managerial 
behaviour, limiting diversification decisions (especially unrelated)
10
.  
In addition to an analysis of the different use of debt in specialized or diversified firms and, 
more specifically, in firms adopting related or unrelated diversification, the present study attempts 
to verify the changing role of capital-structure determinants for these different categories of firms. 
Accordingly, it tests whether, in reaching capital-structure decisions based on different degrees and 
directions of diversification, firms seek to move toward a target optimal-leverage ratio (according to 
the trade-off theory). The standard trade-off theory (discussed in detail by Frank and Goyal 2008) 
suggests that firms maximize their value when the benefits from debt (tax shield, the disciplinary 
role of debt, and the fact that debt suffers less than outside equity from informational costs) equal 
the marginal cost of the debt (bankruptcy costs, agency costs between shareholders and 
bondholders, lack of financial flexibility). According to the trade-off theory, a firm has to set a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
scheduled debt payment, thanks to general-purpose asset liquidity, provides security for the loan provided, reducing the 
cost of capital and increasing the debt capacity.   
9
 Managers, acting as agents, may make non-profitable investments, which are inconsistent with the objective of value 
creation for shareholders (the principal); while shareholders are strictly interested in the maximization of shareholder 
value, managers consider the firm as an instrument to increase their wage, self-esteem, private benefits, and, generally, 
their human capital value. In paying attention to all these benefits, of which just one is based on shareholder value, 
managers may exhibit opportunistic behaviours. 
10
 A diversified firm, especially if organised in unrelated business segments, will increase the use of debt, under the 
influence of the stakeholders, to constrain potential opportunistic behaviours of the management, that does not allow to 
face the interest payment at the due deadline (Jensen 1986). Therefore, debt prevents manager from using 
diversification to destroy value (for private benefit). 
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target debt level and then gradually move toward it. Existing capital structure theories have 
different implications about a firm’s adjustment process toward this target level. According to the 
trade-off theory, given an equilibrium level of leverage ratio, a firm will strive to reach this target. 
In the presence of a deviation from the equilibrium level, firms will rebalance their capital 
structures toward the target level. In a static framework, this adjustment occurs instantaneously. 
With respect to transaction costs, the adjustment process will be incomplete in a given year. 
Specifically, the dynamic version of the trade-off theory implies that adjustment costs will prevent 
firms from constantly adjusting their leverage ratio
11
. Moreover, the trade-off theory states that if 
firms follow a target optimal level of debt, deviations from the equilibrium level are expected to be 
temporary and therefore the speed of adjustment will be relatively high. Conversely, if firms do not 
attribute great importance to their target leverage ratios (or if the transaction costs are high), then an 
adjustment of capital structure toward the optimal level, for example in response to a shock, will be 
slow or even non-existent in a given year.  
While the main research compares the adjustment speed among countries, looking to 
institutional differences, this study aims to provide the first analysis within Italy, measuring also the 
different effect for related diversified firms, where operational synergies and core competences 
resource sharing are provided, compared to unrelated diversified firms, where an internal capital 
market works and tax benefits, jointly with a reduced business risk, are provided. 
3. Methodology and Variables 
 In this empirical analysis, different financial behaviours, in terms of capital-structure 
choices, were taken into account according to their degree and direction, related or unrelated, of 
diversification. Firm leverage (variable named debt), measured as the ratio of total financial debt to 
total financial debt plus equity (Rajan and Zingales 1995), was used as the dependent variable.  
Diversification was measured by taking into account the number of business segments to 
define product diversification, the amount of sales in each business segment and identifying the 
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 Firms must trade off these adjustment costs with the costs of being away from the equilibrium level, with the latter 
defined as the costs for operating with a less-than-optimal capital structure. Firms will rebalance their capital structure 
only when the costs of deviating from the equilibrium level exceed the adjustment costs. 
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degree of relatedness for each segment. In Italy, diversification is assessed through the Standard 
Industrial Codes (S.I.C. code). Specifically, entropy indicators were employed in the empirical 
analysis as the main measures to operationalize diversification, as they allowed the objectivity of 
the product-count measures to be combined with the ability to apply the relatedness concept 
categorically, weighting the businesses by the relative size of their sales (Jacquemin and Berry 
1979, Palepu 1985). Entropy measures consider simultaneously the number of businesses in which 
a firm operates, the distribution of a firm’s total sales across industry segments, and the different 
degrees of relatedness among the various industries. The entropy measure of total level of 
diversification (DT) is calculated as ΣPj * ln(1/Pj), where P refers to the proportion of sales in 
business segment j and ln(1/pj) is the weight for that segment. Therefore, this indicator considers 
the number of segments in which a firm operates and the relative importance of each segment for 
firm sales. The DT variable is a better diversification measure compared to the Herfendahl index 
because it can be decomposed into the related and unrelated component of diversification. The 
related diversification index (DR) and the unrelated diversification index (DU) take into account the 
roles of all business units in which the firm is involved, without over-emphasizing only those 
business segments with higher proportions of sales. DR is the related diversification index resulting 
from businesses different at 3 or 4-digit segment, within a 2-digit industry group; vice versa, DU is 
the unrelated diversification index resulting from businesses in different 2-digit industry groups
12
. 
 To verify the existences of differences in capital-structure determinants for groups of firms 
the following model was used: 
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 DR is the related diversification index resulting from businesses in a 4-digit segment within a 2-digit industry group. 
For example, Barilla, operates in Pasta production industry and in Sauce industry, different at 4-digit; both are related. 
DU is the unrelated diversification index resulting from businesses in different 2-digit industry groups. For example, it 
is unrelated a firm operating in Paper and Allied Products and Textile Mill Products, different at 2-digit industry code. 
Villalonga (2000) claimed that in many research on diversification there were some data trouble in the collection and 
treatment of data. To avoid mechanical treatment of data we used some rational adjustment, jointly with the number on 
digits in the Industry Code, to appreciate the type of diversification. We considered as related two businesses when they 
provide a product or service to a similar group of customer, sharing the same technology in the production system or 
operating in the same industry as client and supplier. For example, Clothing industry and Textile industry, that are 
different at 2 digits, are considered complementary, and so related. Overall, these adjustments comprised aproximately 
7% of the sample. 
 9 
Debt = f (ROA, non-debt tax shield, ownership concentration, tangibility, size, growth 
opportunities) 
  
 A cluster analysis approach was applied to determine whether structural differences were 
present within the sample. In this latter case, instead of using a deterministic approach, as in Lowe 
et al. (1994) and Singh et al. (2003), we chose an inductive approach to identify potential structural 
differences, with respect to diversification strategy, arising within the sample. Firms in the sample 
were classified as specialized, related-diversified, or unrelated-diversified, depending upon the 
results of a k-mean cluster analysis
13
.  
Previous work (Kremp et al. 1999, De Miguel and Pindado 2001 and Ozkan 2001) 
emphasized the dynamic adjustment process involved in achieving a target debt-to-equity ratio, that 
has to be considered by analyzing capital-structure determinants. In this paper it is interesting to 
verify whether different product diversification features can affect the speed of adjustment and, as a 
consequence, the search of a target debt ratio (leverage). 
In the presence of transaction costs, firms do not automatically adjust their debt level; 
instead, they follow a target adjustment model (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999, De Miguel and 
Pindado 2001, Gaud et al. 2005, Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006, Flannery and Rangan 2006, Huang 
and Ritter 2009), according to the following: 
Debtit – Debtit-1 = α (Debt
*
it – Debtit-1), with 0<α<1                               (1) 
where Debtit – Debtit-1 is the difference between the debt level of firm i at time t in the 
current vs. the previous period, and Debt*it is the target debt level of firm i at time t. The target-
adjustment coefficient α measures the relevance of the transaction costs and is assumed to be a 
sample-wide constant. If α = 0, then Debtit = Debtit-1 and the transaction costs are so high that no 
firm will adjust its debt level and the debt level will remain the same as in the previous year. 
However, if α = 1, then Debtit = Debt
*
it and a firm automatically adjusts its debt level to the target. 
When α is between 0 and 1, firms adjust their debt level such that it is inversely proportional to the 
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 The k-means cluster analysis identifies the optimal numbers of clusters (groups) the sample can be sorted, not known 
a priori, computed from the data in a way to minimize variability within the clusters and to maximize variability 
between clusters. 
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adjustment (transactional) costs. As the value of α approaches 1, adjustment of the current capital 
structure toward either the target or an optimal capital structure becomes more rapid.    
A common approach to measure the unobservable target debt level is to estimate it. Here, we 
follow the approach originally suggested by De Miguel and Pindado (2001). Therefore, in equation 
(1) the (unobserved) target level ratio Debt
*
it is estimated from the following equation: 
Debt
*
it = β0 + ∑
=
n
1  j
βj xitj + uit                                                   (2) 
 
where x is a set of j capital structure determinants of firm i at time t, and u is the error term. 
Developing equation (1), the actual debt level is: 
 
                Debtit = α Debt
*
it + (1 - α ) Debtit-1 (3) 
 
Incorporating equation (2) into equation (3) and rearranging yields the estimable model: 
 
                         Debtit = (1 - α ) Debtit-1 + α β0 + α ∑
=
n
1  j
βj xitj + uit (4)  
 
Equation (4) can be viewed as a “linear model.” The parameters α and  β are estimated 
jointly, but the value of β can be retrieved by dividing it by α.  
Table 1 explains the direction of the sign of the target-adjustment model in order to better 
interpret the resulting coefficients of the regressions. If the coefficient (1 - α ) is close to 1, the 
adjustment process is slow; if it is close to 0, then adjustment occurs rapidly. 
=== Here Table 1 === 
Therefore, to take into account the existence of a dynamic adjustment process with respect 
to the target debt-to-equity ratio, and to analyze the determinants of capital structure, the lag value 
of the dependent variable is added as an explanatory variable. The effect of one period of lagged 
debt level is useful in understanding whether firms have optimal capital structure, and if so, the 
degree of divergence (convergence) from (to) the target. 
 11 
Panel-data estimation was used in the present study because it is appropriate for analyzing 
the dynamic nature of capital-structure decisions. The estimation method was selected in order to 
avoid unobservable heterogeneity and endogeneity. 
 In fact, because firms are heterogeneous there are always characteristics influencing capital 
structure which are difficult to measure or hard to obtain, and which do not enter our model. 
Therefore, if we do not control for this heterogeneity, we will run the risk of obtaining biased 
results. Unlike cross-sectional analysis, the panel data methodology has a great advantage in that it 
allows us to control for unobservable heterogeneity through an individual (firm-specific) effect, ηi. 
We also included the variable dt to measure the temporal effect with corresponding year dummy 
variables
14
, taking into account the effect of macroeconomic variables on corporate capital 
structure. Therefore, consistent with Bond and Meghir (1994), our approach controlled for 
unobservable firm-specific fixed effects and for the time dummy variable. Consequently, in order to 
eliminate individual heterogeneity, our model was transformed into the following equation: 
        Debtit = (1 - α ) Debtit-1 + α β0 + α ∑
=
n
1  j
βj xitj + ηi. + dt + υ it (5)  
 Therefore, the error term in our models uit, has been split into components. First, the above 
mentioned individual or firm-specific effect, ηi. Second, dt that measures the time-specific effect by 
the year dummies.  Finally, vit is the random disturbance. 
 In addition, the clear endogeneity of the corporate decision variables in our model, and 
especially with the use of the lag value of the debt level, could seriously affect the estimation 
results. Statistically, endogeneity means that the model’s errors are not truly random and so the 
regression is mis-specified in a way that makes identifying a causal effect between two economic 
variables difficult. There are several potential sources of endogeneity. One of the more relevant is 
reverse causality. For example, it is certainly possible that some variables, as ROA, influences the 
debt level, but it is also possible the other way around, that leverage can influence ROA. Although 
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 There are 26 year dummies for the 27 years of analysis and each year dummy x is equal to 1 for the year x and equal 
to 0 for years different from x. 
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poor performance may lead to higher observed debt levels (either because distressed firms borrow 
more, or because their market values decline, which increases their leverage ratios), high leverage 
levels may also lead firms to experience poor performance. Moreover, the literature, theoretically 
(Jensen 1986) and empirically (Balakrishnan and Fox 1993, Kochhar and Hitt 1998), highlighted 
that there are some studies trying to explain the effects of diversification strategy on the financial 
choices of the firms and others trying to explain the effects of debt/equity choice on diversification 
strategy. Another issue is related to the fact that leverage can be chosen by management 
concurrently with other firm’s decisions, raising a problem of simultaneity that can suggest the use 
of lags of some variables. The simultaneity bias that could be present may be a result of joint 
determination that is present between many corporate variables. For example, the decision to issue 
debt can be made concurrently with the decision of a new investment in diversification. As a 
consequence, due to the fact that variables may correlate with the error term, and the simultaneity 
bias between the leverage measure and the explanatory variables can be problematic (especially 
with the lagged dependent variable used), seriously affecting the estimation results, it may be 
preferable to use instrumental variables
15
.  
Therefore, the panel-data methodology and estimation by the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) together allow studies of the dynamic nature of capital-structure decisions at the 
firm level, thereby eliminating unobservable heterogeneity and controlling for the endogeneity 
problem.  
   The GMM approach was used to estimate equation 5. Specifically, as suggested by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), this equation was estimated in first differences, using lag effects as instruments
16
. 
However, Monte Carlo simulations suggest that the first-difference GMM estimator could display 
large finite sample biases and very low precision in the estimation of the autoregressive parameter 
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 Testing the hypothesis of endogeneity explicitly involves testing for endogeneity in the variables, to determine 
whether there is a simultaneity bias in the OLS regression results, using a standard Hausman test. The results of the test 
of simultaneity suggest the presence of this problem. 
16
 Since the lagged dependent variables correlate with the error term, parameters estimated by conventional panel-data 
methodologies, such as the fixed effects model, lack desirable properties, including consistency and absence of bias. 
Such biases can be avoided by using the GMM after taking the first-order difference. For details, see Baltagi (2001). 
 13 
(Blundell and Bond 1998)
17
. Blundell and Bond (1998) address these shortcomings of the first 
difference GMM estimator by introducing the GMM in system estimator
18
. We use all the right-
hand-side variables in the model lagged twice or more as instruments. Specifically, in order to 
eliminate the individual effect, we took first differences of the variables, and then we estimated the 
model thus obtained. This approach is correct if there is no second-order serial correlation between 
error terms of the first-differenced equation. In our model, this hypothesis of second-order serial 
correlation is always rejected. The statistics m2 were used to test for the lack of second-order serial 
correlation. Concerning the instruments, the Sargan statistic, which tests for the presence of over-
identifying restrictions and for the validity of instrumental variables, is reported, as are two Wald 
statistics. Wald 1 is a test of the joint significance of the time dummy variables, and Wald 2 a test of 
the joint significance of the reported determinants.  
Theoretical and empirical studies
19
 have shown that ROA, non-debt tax-shields, ownership, 
tangibility, size, and growth opportunities affect capital structure. These variables were also included 
in this empirical study to underline the relation between diversification strategies and capital 
structure. In addition, the role of these determinants with respect to diversification status was 
compared in the sorted sample.  
ROA – The relation between the capital structure and the return on asset (ROA) is 
theoretically and empirically controversial. In the pecking-order theory, each investment is financed 
with internal funds, primarily retained earnings, then with new issues of debt and, finally, with new 
issues of equity (Myers 1984). It follows that a more profitable firm is more likely to substitute debt 
for internal funds. Therefore, according to the pecking-order theory, a negative relation among debt 
levels and ROA is expected. However, according to the trade-off theory, more-profitable firms 
prefer debt in order to benefit from the tax shield; thus, a positive correlation with leverage is 
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 Weak instruments in difference GMM motivated the development of system GMM (Blundell and Bond 1998). 
18
 System GMM augments difference GMM by estimating simultaneously in differences and levels, the two equations 
being distinctly instrumented. 
19
 The work of Harris and Raviv (1991) is still valid in summarizing many of the empirical studies on the capital-
structure determinant of US firms, while Rajan and Zingales (1995) showed the main determinants in an international 
context. 
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expected. Empirical evidence from previous studies supported both theories (Harris and Raviv 
1991). Our empirical model included ROA defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
relative to total assets.  
Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) - The Italian legislation specifies that firms are subject to a 
complex tax system. This system is difficult to manage, and allows for strong penalties to be 
imposed on transgressing managers and entrepreneurs. Moreover, the overall tax rate for companies 
has been one of the highest in Europe for decades, with an overall tax rate of about 40-43%. As a 
consequence, in Italy firms are particularly sensitive to the possibility of tax deductions. DeAngelo 
and Masulis (1980) argued that firms able to reduce taxes by methods other than deducting interest 
will employ less debt in their capital structure. Non-debt tax shields may be regarded as substitutes 
for tax benefits of debt financing; as a consequence, tax advantage of leverage will decrease when 
other tax deductions (such as depreciation) increase. Accordingly, if a firm has a large amount of 
NDTS, such as depreciation, the probability of negative taxable income is higher and it is less likely 
that the amount of debt will be increased for tax reasons. Consistent with this argument, debt level 
should be inversely related to the level of the NDTS, measured in this study as depreciation divided 
by total assets.  
Ownership concentration – Due to the fact that the governance of a firm, and thus its 
financial decision-making, is strictly influenced by the ownership structure (Jensen and Meckling 
1976), a variable that addressed ownership control has to be included. A feature of the Italian 
economy is that, in most cases, the Italian model of corporate governance far from the one proposed 
by Berle and Means (1932); there is not a wide separation between ownership and control. 
Generally, the largest shareholder holds a substantial block of shares, holding an effective control 
(La Porta et al. 1999). In a country such as Italy, the inefficiency of law, combined with weak 
enforcement and the weak legal protection prevalent in the Italian economic system leads to a 
higher concentration of ownership as a mechanism of protecting owners’ interests (La Porta et al. 
1999). Indeed, the dominant shareholder has a relevant discretionary power to use financial 
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resources, sometimes allowing for opportunistic behaviours. Individuals holding a majority of the 
controlling power (high level of equity shares) are not inclined to loosen their grip on their 
companies. This can limit the financial resources available to a firm because growth frequently 
requires significant levels of outside equity resources. Moreover, one of the disadvantages of this 
tight concentration of ownership is that it acts as an additional factor influencing financial decisions 
and may serve as a constraint on a firm’s expansion - since growth often requires a significant 
amount of outside financing, which would reduce control
20
. Thus, the variable ownership 
concentration included in the model takes into account an important characteristic of Italian firms’ 
ownership structure and considers the percentage of shares held by the primary shareholder (who 
has the highest percentage of shares). 
Tangibility - The agency costs of debt due to the possibility of moral hazards on the part of 
borrowers increases when firms cannot collateralize their debt (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Hence, 
lenders will require more-favorable terms and firms may choose equity instead. To mitigate this 
problem, a large percentage of a firm’s assets can be used as collateral. Tangible assets provide 
better collateral for loans and thus are associated with higher leverage (Titman and Wessels 1988, 
Rajan and Zingales 1995). Asset tangibility is measured as the ratio of property, plants, and 
equipment to total assets.  
Size - In previous studies, the size of a firm was found to be an important determinant of 
leverage (Harris and Raviv 1991, Rajan and Zingales 1995). Large firms tend to have more 
collateralizable assets and more-stable cash flows. Thus, typically, a company’s size is inversely 
related to the probability of default, which suggests that large firms are expected to carry more debt. 
Diamond (1989) also argued that large established firms have better reputations in the debt markets 
and thus can assume more debt. The size of a firm is measured by the log of its total assets.  
Growth opportunities - Firms with high growth opportunities will retain financial flexibility 
through a low leverage in order to be able to exercise those opportunities in subsequent years 
                                                 
20
 This concentration, a by-product of the relative lack of protection of minority shareholders by Italian securities law, 
has been suggested to also restrict growth. 
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(Myers 1977). A firm with outstanding debt may forgo such opportunities because investment 
effectively transfers wealth from stockholders to debtholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Therefore, leverage is expected to be negatively related to growth opportunities. Growth 
opportunities are expressed by the growth rate of annual sales (sales growth).   
4. Data and Descriptives 
The analysis is based on the data provided by Mediobanca - Ricerche & Studi (R&S) for 
Italy. The R&S Directory is the source provided by Mediobanca, the first edition of which appeared 
in 1976, is an annual publication that contains a broad range of high-quality financial and non-
financial information on the leading Italian companies, in terms of total assets and value added; the 
aim is to provide a fully comprehensive financial profile of their operations, enabling the user to 
gain in-depth knowledge of large leading Italian companies
21
. The sample consisted of a panel 
made up of 180 Italian listed and unlisted firms evaluated in the period from 1980 to 2006. Data for 
a firm included in the sample were considered only if available for at least six consecutive years 
between 1980 and 2006
22
. Firms belonging to the financial-services industry were excluded. The 
sample comprised 2085 observations. This is a unique database, created using the R&S books until 
the 2000 and the PDF-files up to the 2006. R&S is the only database on Italy with details on the 
numbers and the amount of sales for each business segments, that allows analysis on the corporate 
diversification; we get all the data available with the features we need.  
Compared with previous studies, our sample focused on a smaller number of firms but the 
analysis was based on a longer period. Previous empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
diversification on capital-structure determinants is quite limited. Rumelt (1974), for 249 USA firms, 
observed that firms employing a strategy of unrelated diversification have the highest debt level. 
                                                 
21
 R&S by Mediobanca, available through the subscription of University of Calabria, provides a detailed balance sheet 
analysis, complemented by a profile of the company's history and its operations, the names of its directors, and major 
shareholders, figures on production and market share, details of production facilities, sales, employees and, in the case 
of listed companies, stock market performance.  
22
 This strong requirement is a necessary condition since we lost one-year data in the construction of some variables 
(the growth opportunities variable, for instance), we lost another year-data because of the estimation of the model in 
first differences, and four consecutive year information is required in order to test for second-order serial correlation, as 
Arellano and Bond (1991) point out. We need to test for the second-order serial correlation because our estimation 
method, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is based on this assumption. 
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Barton and Gordon (1988), for 279 USA firms, and Lowe et al. (1994), for 176 Australian firms, 
obtained similar results. Kochran and Hitt (1998), focusing on 187 USA firms, showed that equity 
financing is preferred for related diversification, while unrelated diversification is associated with 
debt financing. Anderson et al. (2000) found that 199 USA multi-business firms have higher debt 
ratios than firms that operate in a single segment. In contrast, Alonso (2003) analyzed 480 Spanish 
manufacturing firms during the period from 1991 to 1994 but did not find a significant relation 
between leverage and diversification. While many of these articles used the deterministic Rumelt 
categories to study the capital structure-diversification relation (Lowe et al. 1994, Barton and 
Gordon 1988, Rumelt 1974), others used directly total diversification measures (Low and Chen 
2004, Alonso 2003, Singh et al. 2003), while just Kochhar and Hitt (1998) use the related-unrelated 
diversification measures. Instead, our analysis tried to be comprehensive applying a multiple 
research approach and paying attention to the related-unrelated type of diversification.  
An inductive approach was applied to identify structural differences between the firms in the 
sample with respect to diversification strategies. Therefore, a k-means cluster analysis was carried 
out with the goal of verifying whether there were differences between groups of firms in terms of 
diversification strategies (according to the DT, DR, and DU). Therefore, we ran a k-means cluster 
analysis using DT, DR and DU as input data in order to identify and to profile firms according to 
their diversification features. The number of clusters k leading to the greatest separation (distance) 
was not known a priori but was computed from the data. The goals were to minimize variability 
within the clusters and to maximize variability between clusters. The cluster analysis examined two, 
three, four, five, six and seven clusters and, to infer the correct cluster number, we conducted a 
pseudo-F test (Calinski and Harabasz 1974). Pseudo-F increases up to the three-cluster solution, 
suggesting the latter as the optimal one. The three-cluster solution yielded F-values larger than 
74.318 (all p-values 0.000); therefore, three clusters were identified that presented different 
diversification features. For robustness we re-ran the k-means cluster analysis using as input data 
DT, DR and DU jointly with some control variables to take into account firm-specific factors 
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(ROA, Leverage and Size); the results were less then 1% different in the output, suggesting that the 
diversification variables used provide important scores to differentiate firms
23
.  
To gain further support for the three-cluster solution, we conducted a validation procedure 
suggested by Lattin et al. (2003). Specifically, we split the sample into two subgroups by applying a 
random selection procedure. The calibration sample included 1475 firms (around 70%), whereas the 
validation sample encompasses 610 firms (around 30%). First, we ran a k-means cluster analysis on 
the calibration sample and saved final centroids. The resulting three-cluster solution was 
substantially identical to the whole sample analysis. Second, we used final centroids from the 
calibration data to classify firms from the validation sample. This classification is denoted as S1. 
Third, we ran a k-means cluster analysis on the validation sample and used final centroids from 
such application to classify firms from the validation sample. This classification is denoted as S2. 
Finally, we cross-tabulated S1 versus S2 and assessed the agreement between the two solutions. The 
latter step was achieved by computing the Rand Index (Lattin et al. 2003), which indicates the 
proportion of agreement between S1 and S2 over all the possible combinations between firms in the 
clusters. We found a Rand Index of 0.925, which shows a quite perfect agreement between S1 and 
S2 and suggests a strong capability of the clustering model to classify firms. 
Firms in cluster 1 were low in diversification measures. Firms in cluster 2 had a high level 
of total diversification, with a high degree of related diversification and a low degree of unrelated 
diversification. Firms in cluster 3 had a high level of total diversification, with a low degree of 
related diversification and a high degree of unrelated diversification. According to these results, and 
by looking at the descriptives of these three clusters, it was possible to describe, refer and label to 
these groups of firms as “specialized” (cluster 1), “related-diversified” (cluster 2), and “unrelated-
diversified” (cluster 3). We computed cross-tabulations to describe clusters relative to the main 
variables of the analysis. Table 2 show the descriptive statistics for the three groups of firms as 
outcomes of the cluster analysis. 
                                                 
23
 Moreover, as a further robustness check, we ran the cluster analysis with period-average value for all the firms. The 
results did not change the cluster membership. 
 19 
=== Here Table 2 === 
The first part of table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
analysis. Some variables, such as debt, were symmetrically distributed while others, such as 
diversification measures, were quite asymmetrically distributed. The second part of table 2 
compares, respectively, the mean by groups of firms, sorting the samples by groups resulting from 
the cluster analysis.  
The cluster analysis reveals relevant and statistically significant differences among the three 
groups of firms, showing that the debt level in the firms depended on the type of diversification. 
Related diversified firms made much less use of debt than was the case for either unrelated-
diversified or specialized firms (as predicted by the transaction cost theory). Unrelated-diversified 
firms carried more debt than either related-diversified or specialized firms, probably due to the low 
probability of distress and the low cost of debt (coinsurance effect). Therefore, it is important to 
differentiate among the financial policies adopted by product-diversified firms with respect to the 
degree of relatedness of the business segments in which they operate.    
5. Empirical Results 
This section presents the results obtained by estimating the model with the GMM technique. 
The key identifying assumption, that there is no serial correlation in the error terms, was verified by 
testing for the absence of a second-order serial correlation in the first residuals. The Sargan statistic, 
which confirms the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term
24
, as well as 
the m2 tests, suggested that the dynamic feature of our model for the sample of Italian firms was 
valid, well-specified,
 
and consistent
25
.  
Table 3 shows the GMM results for groups of firms compared according to the degree and 
direction of diversification, defining diversity by the cluster analysis approach. 
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 We have applied some straightforward techniques that provide the basis for some minimally arbitrary robustness 
tests: simply cutting the number of instrument count (lag) and examining the behaviour of the coefficient estimates and 
overidentification tests. As suggested by Roodman (2007), we repeatedly selected random subsets from the collection of 
potential instruments and looked how key results such as coefficients of interest and the p-value on the Sargan statistic 
vary with the number of instruments. None of the coefficients systematically lose significance as the instrument count 
falls, this should signal the lack of overfitting problems. 
25
 Specifically, the Sargan statistic confirms the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term in the  
model, and the hypothesis of serial correlation in the residuals is always rejected. 
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=== Here Table 3 === 
The previous year’s debt ratio has a positive influence on the current debt level, significant 
at the 1% level. As a general overview the size of the coefficient of the lagged debt level variable, 
(1 - α), interpreted according to the direction provided in table 1, was in the range 0.29–0.65. As a 
consequence, the parameter α, which measures a firm’s speed of adjustment of the current debt ratio 
toward a target debt ratio, was in the range 0.35-0.71.  
Therefore, the adjustment coefficient presented a relatively wide range, having values below 
and above 0.5, showing a certain variety in the financial behaviour for firms with different 
diversification strategies
26
. In particular, the speed of this adjustment was changing among the three 
groups of firms, according to the different diversification strategy adopted; the significant results 
obtained for the coefficient (1-α) showed a wide spread, especially between related and unrelated 
diversified firms. As argued by Ozkan (2001), the adjustment process is a trade-off between the 
adjustment (transaction) costs involved in moving towards a target ratio and the costs of being in 
disequilibrium. If the latter costs are greater than the former ones, then the estimated coefficient 1 - 
α should be close to zero and firms will try to quickly attain the target of an optimal debt level. 
Based on the estimated adjustment speed, convergence toward a target seems to explain much of the 
variation in firms’ debt ratios. However, as showed in table 4, it is fundamental to differentiate this 
effect for level of diversification and for type of diversification, related or unrelated. 
Specifically, specialized firms reported a target-adjustment coefficient that, although is 
statistically significant, did not show any economic significance; a value close to 0.5 means that it is 
both far from zero as well as from one. Instead, firms that had adopted a related diversification 
strategy moved more slowly toward their target capital structure, while firms with an unrelated 
diversification strategy quickly adjusted their capital structure to the equilibrium level. In the latter 
case, the role of the internal capital market is supposed to be relevant in providing support in 
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 According to table 1, if the coefficients of the target-adjustment model is close to 1, firms do not adjust, while if the 
coefficients of the target-adjustment model is close to 0 firms automatically adjust. Thus, if the coefficient of the target-
adjustment model is lower than 0.5, that separates in two equal half the possible range of the target-adjustment 
coefficients  [0 – 1], firms tend to adjust, and the opposite can be implied if the target-adjustment model is higher than 
0.5. 
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adjusting toward the target debt level. According to the transaction cost theory, unrelated-
diversified firms—by mainly using general-purpose assets, which have a high liquidation value in 
case of bankruptcy—have a higher capacity to meet scheduled interest payments and can easily 
manage more debt. Therefore, easier access to the credit market together with the existence of an 
internal capital market allows unrelated-diversified firms to strictly move toward a target debt ratio. 
Conversely, related-diversified firms, which mainly use special-purpose assets and which have a 
low liquidation value, more than specialized firms, face higher transaction costs and adjust 
relatively slowly to their target debt ratio. These firms face contingent problems in their access to 
the credit market and are more vulnerable to situations that must be dealt with by management over 
time.  
Therefore, we found that while unrelated-diversified firms quickly move toward an optimal 
debt ratio, related-diversified firms do so more slowly. Firms that adopt a related diversification 
strategy are subject to greater transaction costs and thus have to maintain financial flexibility to 
satisfy their financial needs and be able to not miss investments with positive net present value. 
Conversely, firms that have diversified into unrelated businesses are subject to lower transaction 
costs and, in general, are able to quickly adjust to their target debt level; they are thus less exposed 
to contingencies in the capital market. In this case the results generally supported the trade-off 
theory for unrelated diversified firms. 
As previous research has shown, capital structure depends on several firm-specific 
characteristics, and diversification features seems to reveal differences in their effects.  
The results, generally, show that the choice of debt level is a negative function of ROA and 
NDTS, and a positive function of size and tangibility. In general, to differentiate between related 
and unrelated diversification seemed to be justified; a comparison of the three groups of firms 
established that there are relevant differences in the sign (ROA and ownership) and in the intensity 
(tangibility and size) of the coefficients of capital-structure determinants.  
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The link between ROA and debt was different for unrelated-diversified firms compared to 
related-diversified or specialized firms. The positive link between ROA and debt indicated that 
more-profitable unrelated-diversified firms preferred debt as a source of finance. According to the 
trade-off model, expected bankruptcy costs decline when ROA increases, the deductibility of 
interest payments induces more-profitable firms to use debt, and a higher debt ratio helps to control 
for agency problems by forcing managers to pay out more of a firm’s excess cash. Conversely, a 
negative link between ROA and debt was exhibited by specialized and, especially, by related-
diversified firms. According to the pecking-order theory, these two types of firms seem to prefer to 
raise capital, first from retained earnings and second from debt. This preference is due to the costs 
associated with external-financing issues in the presence of asymmetric information. Therefore, the 
market seems to raise doubts about the soundness of strategies based on diversification into related 
business, and such firms have to finance this choice through internal resources.  
The relation between NDTS and debt was always negative and it was slightly stronger for 
unrelated-diversified firms. This result corroborates the role of the tax factor, in which NDTS is a 
substitute for debt in reducing firms’ tax burdens. When NDTS exist, then firms are not likely to 
fully use debt tax shields (substitution effect). In other words, firms with large NDTS have less 
incentive to use debt tax shield to benefit interest deductibility, and thus may issue less debt.  
Ownership exerted a negative influence on debt ratio for specialized firms (and mainly for 
related-diversified firms) and a positive one for unrelated-diversified firms. In particular, when 
diversified firms were sorted according to the degree of correlation among businesses, then 
ownership concentration influenced capital-structure decisions for related-diversified firms while, 
vice versa, it positively affected debt use in unrelated-diversified firms. For the latter type of firm, 
debt and ownership exerted a controlling effect on management with respect to value-destroying 
decisions. 
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Specialized firms and related-diversified firms were also sensitive to the level of tangibility, 
since higher levels of tangible assets grant these firms cheaper access to debt
27
. These assets are less 
subject to information asymmetries and usually retain a high value in case of liquidation. More-
tangible assets alleviate bondholder-shareholder conflicts, since creditors have a guarantee of 
repayment, even during liquidation. This result suggests that specialized firms and related-
diversified firms use tangible assets as collateral when negotiating borrowing. Vice versa, 
unrelated-diversified firms are able to borrow by relying on cash-flow stability and reduced 
business risks; when cash flows are more stable and firms are less exposed to the risk of 
bankruptcy, the relevance of tangibility to borrowing disappears.  
Size was also positively related to the debt ratio. It was particularly relevant in granting 
better access to credit for specialized firms and related-diversified firms; the effect of the coefficient 
was economically stronger for such firms than for unrelated-diversified firms. Relatively large firms 
tend to be less prone to bankruptcy, since they have better access to the credit market, as it is less 
subject to asymmetric information, and therefore are granted better borrowing conditions. For 
unrelated-diversified firms, which are inherently larger, size is less relevant in affecting debt choice. 
Finally, the growth opportunity variable was not statistically significant. While theoretical 
arguments assume the relevant role of the growth opportunity factor, the lack of any significant 
result could be due to the fact that we used sales growth as proxy. In general, this is not a good 
proxy, because it accounts for past growth and not for future opportunities. However, we could not 
apply better proxies as the Tobin’s Q, scrutinizing a sample of Italian listed and unlisted firms. 
 
To sum-up, the behaviour of unrelated-diversified firms seems to support the trade-off 
theory. In addition to the rapid speed of adjustment, this conclusion is justified by the positive link 
between ROA and debt for these firms, compared to the negative link for the other two groups of 
firms. According to the coinsurance effect, diversified firms in unrelated business are less 
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 From the viewpoint of transaction-cost economics, tangible assets usually have less asset specificity, which increases 
their use as collateral for debt to reduce lenders’ risks (Williamson 1988). 
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financially constrained and less sensitive to changes in ROA. Instead, the tax benefit associated 
with the use of debt by more-profitable firms is particularly relevant for unrelated-diversified firms. 
Specialized firms and firms adopting a strategy of related diversification prefer to preserve their 
financial flexibility; they use less debt to be able to exploit future growth opportunities. Unrelated-
diversified firms rely on the internal capital market to take advantage of growth opportunities and 
they use debt for tax reasons. The role of tangibility as collateral, especially in the presence of 
asymmetric information, is absent for unrelated-diversified firms but relevant for specialized and 
related-diversified firms. Moreover, size is particularly of importance for specialized and related-
diversified firms. By contrast, unrelated-diversified firms, which are generally larger than 
specialized or related-diversified firms, have access to credit based on factors less connected to size, 
such as risk diversification. Due to the reduced variance in the future cash supplies of an unrelated-
diversified firm, its creditors rely on the combined fortunes of the firm’s total operating units. Its 
cash flows are less than perfectly correlated, and tangibility and size become less important factors 
(coinsurance effect). 
6. The Direct Effect of Diversification, both Related and Unrelated, on Capital Structure 
In this section we directly analyse the effect of diversification measures, both related and 
unrelated, on the use of debt. In this case the model is characterized by the direct consideration of 
the diversification measures in the empirical analysis, to test directly the link between 
diversification, related as well as unrelated, and debt/equity choice. This approach permitted us to 
directly identify the sign and magnitude of the relation between diversification and capital structure, 
differentiating between the effect of related and unrelated diversification. Therefore, the direct 
effect of diversification measures on debt was investigated, in a traditional capital structure 
determinants model, according to the following empirical form: 
 
Debt = f (diversification, ROA, non-debt tax shield, ownership concentration, tangibility, size, 
growth opportunities) 
The variables are as explained in the previous section. Table 4 reports the results for the 
model based directly on diversification measures. Measures of diversification were used to capture 
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the direction and magnitude of the effect on capital structure. Here we took into account the fact 
that DR and DU are sensitive to the number of business segments of a firm by including in the 
regression, both when considering DR and DR alternatively, a variable called Number of Corporate 
Segments to control for the fact that the effect of an increase of DR (or DU) on Debt can be 
sensitive to the different level of diversification
28
. 
=== Here Table 4 === 
The estimate of the speed of adjustment of the debt ratio was around 0.426–0.427. 
Therefore, the adjustment coefficient α, which is given by 1 - α, is relatively large (in the sense that 
it is greater then 0.5), providing possibly evidence that firms adjust their debt ratio relatively 
quickly in an attempt to reach their target capital structure.  
Compared to other empirical analyses, the empirical evidence reported here suggests that 
corporate diversification has a substantial influence on a firm’s capital-structure decisions. The 
variable Number of Corporate Segments was negative and statistically significant; it means that the 
overall diversification of a firm has a general negative effect on the use of debt. In particular, DR 
was negative and statistically significant, indicating that related diversification leads to lower levels 
of debt in capital structures. Firms diversified in related segments promoted the use of equity to 
finance the growth of the companies
29
. The coefficient for the DU variable was positive and 
statistically significant. Firms diversified in unrelated segments had significantly higher debt ratios 
and the unrelated-diversification strategy tended to increase their use of debt.  
Therefore, the analysis showed a differential effect of diversification strategy on debt/equity 
choice; specifically, the relation between diversification and capital structure depended upon the 
degree of relatedness. The two types of diversification had opposite effects on debt. Unrelated-
diversified firms had higher debt level than the two other types of firms, and increased their use of 
debt is connected to increase unrelatedness, in contrast to the strategy of related-diversified firms. 
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 A detailed description of the content validity of measure of relatedness are provided in Robins and Wiersema (2003). 
29
 As a robustness test, the analysis also used pure diversification (the number of business segments) and the Rumelt 
measure of specialization (SR), which is interpreted in the opposite sense of total diversification, obtaining the same 
results. The Rumelt measure of related diversification (RR) was not significant. 
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According to the transaction cost hypothesis, an increase in the degree of business relatedness is 
followed by a reduction in the use of debt; special purpose assets, mainly used by related-diversified 
firms, are better managed by less-leveraged firms. Unrelated diversification positively influences 
debt usage, and general-purpose assets, mainly used by unrelated-diversified firms, can provide 
easer access to debt due to their higher liquidation value in the market, in case of default. Moreover, 
unrelated-diversified firms can exploit the tax benefit resulting from diversification into unrelated 
businesses, while benefiting from the reduced business risk Therefore, according to the coinsurance 
effect approach and the transaction-cost hypothesis, unrelated-diversified firms have a higher debt 
capacity and can assume more debt as a source of finance. Regarding control variables, our model 
highlights the relevance of ROA, NDTS, firm size, and growth opportunities in explaining debt 
ratios, in line with previous studies of capital structure (Titman and Wessels 1988, Balakrishnan and 
Fox 1993, Rajan and Zingales 1995).   
7. Conclusion 
The controversial results on capital-structure decisions suggested the need for further 
research, such as an examination of the effectiveness of corporate-strategy analysis in 
understanding capital structure. Accordingly, the present work examined the relation between 
strategy and finance by investigating the role of diversification on capital-structure choices, 
differentiating between related and unrelated diversification.  
Previously, empirical financial studies paid little attention to the role of diversification as a 
determinant of capital structure. The results of the present analysis indicate that the product-
diversification strategies developed by firms indeed affect their capital-structure decisions, together 
with other firm-specific characteristics as well as industrial and institutional factors. While our 
findings point to the importance of diversification in explaining financing choices, they also reveal 
that diversified firms cannot be considered as a homogeneous group. The degree of product 
specialization/diversification and the direction of diversification (related or unrelated) translate into 
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different corporate financial behaviours. Diversification is clearly a determining factor in capital-
structure decisions and thus deserves more attention in future investigations. 
 According to the present descriptive analysis and similarly to the general conclusions of 
earlier studies on the effect of product diversification on capital structure, firms that diversify across 
product lines are likely to have higher debt ratios than non-diversified firms. However, we have 
shown that these observations need to be sorted by the type of diversification. In differentiating 
between the scope of diversification and observing the difference between related and unrelated 
diversification, we found that related-diversified firms have a lower debt ratio than specialized 
firms, whereas unrelated-diversified firms have higher debt level.  
Furthermore, with respect to analyses of capital-structure determinants, related and unrelated 
diversification seems to have opposite effects on debt level and debt determinants. Specifically, a 
related-diversification strategy, which is associated with lower debt ratios and is based on business 
synergies and resource sharing, has a negative influence on debt. By contrast, unrelated diversity, 
which is associated with higher debt usage and based on financial synergies, has a positive effect on 
debt. Accordingly, our results suggest that a diversified firm, organized in unrelated business 
segments, increases its use of debt to take advantage of the tax deductions and benefits derived from 
the coinsurance effect. 
Another important result of this analysis was the large and statistically significant lagged-
debt effect on a firm’s current debt level. This finding implied that there is a target debt-to-equity 
ratio for Italian firms and that it was therefore correct to use a dynamic panel-data analysis. These 
results validated the target-adjustment model for capital-structure decisions, but highlighted a 
differential effect according to diversification strategy. Italian firms tend to move toward an optimal 
debt level such that a trade-off approach well-explains their capital-structure decisions. In 
particular, the capital-structure decisions of unrelated-diversified firms seem to be strictly aimed at 
reaching their target optimal debt level—a behaviour that is consistent with the trade-off hypothesis. 
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Therefore, while an assessment of capital-structure choices must take into account 
diversification strategy, it is equally important that it differentiates between related and unrelated 
product diversification. This conclusion implies that diversification strategy is a feature that 
differentiates firms with respect to their financial behaviours. An interesting direction for future 
empirical studies is the combined effect of international (geographical) diversification and product 
diversification, according to their degree of relatedness, on capital-structure decisions. 
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Table 1 – Interpretation of the coefficients of the target-adjustment model. 
(1 - α ) = 1 
or equivalent to: α = 0 
 (1 - α ) = 0 
or equivalent to: α = 1 
- Firms do not adjust; 
- Debt stays at the previous year’s 
value; 
- There are high (transaction) 
adjustment costs; 
- The costs associated with being in 
disequilibrium are low. 
 - Firms automatically adjust; 
- Debt is instantaneously adjusted to the 
previous year’s value; 
- There are low (transaction) adjustment 
costs; 
- The costs associated with being in 
disequilibrium are high. 
   
(1 - α ) close to 1 
or equivalent to: α close to 0 
 (1 - α ) close to 0 
or equivalent to: α close to 1 
- Firms slowly adjust.  - Firms quickly adjust. 
 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics for the whole sample and comparison across the three groups of 
firms resulting from the cluster analysis. 
 
 
 
Whole sample 
Specialised 
firms 
Related 
diversified 
firms 
Unrelated 
diversified 
firms 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Mean Mean 
ANOVA test on 
differences between all 
three clusters 
(F test and its p-value 
are reported) 
DT  (total 
diversification) 
0.391 0.216 0.445 0.035 0.772 0.884 
350.7 
(0.000) 
DR (related 
diversification)  
0.172 0.000 0.298 0.009 0.652 0.069 
224.7 
(0.000) 
DU (unrelated 
diversification) 
0.219 0.000 0.358 0.025 0.118 0.814 
312.9 
(0.000) 
Debt  0.445 0.453 0.235 0.442 0.369 0.536 
73.9 
(0.000) 
ROA 0.072 0.062 0.082 0.078 0.057 0.069 
105.7 
(0.000) 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 0.061 0.047 0.347 0.055 0.048 0.091 
33.7 
(0.000) 
Ownership 
concentration 
0.657 0.640 0.258 0.703 0.566 0.641 
25.7 
(0.000) 
Tangibility 0.341 0.324 0.153 0.336 0.34 0.356 
19.4 
(0.000) 
Size  20.02 20.08 1.31 19.84 20 20.49 
117.7 
(0.000) 
Growth opportunities: 
sales growth 
0.108 0.068 0.345 0.121 0.089 0.096 
6.0 
(0.000) 
No. observations 2085   1146 485 454  
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Table 3 – Determinants of capital structure choices according to the three groups highlighted by 
the cluster analysis. The Debt represents the dependent variable, explained by the one period lag 
for Debit, Return On Asset, Non-Debt Tax-Shield, Ownership Concentration, Agency Costs of debt 
due to the borrowers moral hazards, Company Size and Sales Growth.  
Variables Specialised firms 
Related diversified 
Firms 
Unrelated diversified 
Firms 
Constant 0.456*** 0.303*** 0.477*** 
Debt t-1 0.512*** 0.648*** 0.294*** 
ROA -0.525*** -0.708*** 0.054*** 
Non-Debt Tax-Shield -0.142*** -0.127*** -0.151* 
Ownership concentration -0.077* -0.013* 0.031* 
Tangibility 0.065** 0.024* -0.149 
Size 0.059** 0.043* 0.019* 
Growth opp.: sales growth 0.094 0.034 0.193 
m2 -2.32 -2.04 -2.10 
Sargan test 98.3 58.7 63.5 
Wald test-1 645.9 619.8 581.7 
Wald test-2 111.4 78.5 74.6 
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The test m2 is second order 
autocorrelation of residuals under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, under the null of 
instruments’ validity. Wald tests 1 and 2 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, and of industry dummies, respectively, under the 
null hypothesis of no relationship.  
 
 
Table 4 – The direct effect of diversification, both related and unrelated, as capital structure determinants. . 
The Debt represents the dependent variable, explained by the one period lag for Debit, the Number of 
Corporate Segments, both the Related and Unrelated Diversification, Return On Asset, Non-Debt Tax-
Shield, Ownership Concentration, Agency Costs of debt due to the borrowers moral hazards, Company Size 
and Sales Growth. 
Variables Whole sample Whole sample 
Constant 0.391*** 0.391*** 
Debt t-1 0.425*** 0.424*** 
Number of Corporate Segments -0.024*** -0.031*** 
DR (related diversification) -0.130***  
DU (unrelated diversification)  0.114***
 
ROA -0.354*** -0.353*** 
Non-Debt Tax-Shield -0.165*** -0.165*** 
Ownership concentration 0.064 0.065 
Tangibility -0.035 -0.036 
Size 0.037*** 0.037*** 
Growth op.: sales growth 0.018* 0.018* 
m2 -2.74 -2.17 
Sargan test 263.5 262.1 
Wald test-1 1222.5 1335.4 
Wald test-2 146.0 183.5 
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The test m2 is second order 
autocorrelation of residuals under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, under the null of 
instruments’ validity. Wald tests 1 and 2 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, and of industry dummies, respectively, under the 
null hypothesis of no relationship.  
 
